investors, since there has been no significant previous research into the quality of risk disclosure practices in China. The time span of three years will be helpful in trying to identify patterns of behaviour in the years before, during and after the crisis. The importance of this paper resides in its provision of evidence concerning several reporting incentives detailing not only the quantity, but also the quality of firms' risk reporting. This will function as a set of guidelines for investors' decision making, and may also motivate reforms and the enhancement of regulations in China, in order to make the market more efficient.
Section 2 sets out the background to Chinese market regulation. Section 3 reviews previous literature and develops our hypotheses. In Section 4, we introduce our methodology and describe our sample. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and provides further analysis, and Section 6 draws conclusions, discusses the limitations of the study, and suggests future research areas.
Background and regulation of the Chinese market
In 2015 the Shanghai stock market faced a crisis that led to a reassessment of the market. In the previous 12 months, it had registered a 150 per cent increase in stock value, but this rise had not been accompanied by a similar growth in earnings (Deloitte, 2015) . Even with this rise, Shanghai's market index has experienced poor performance since 2012, compared with other stock indexes (UK stocks moved up by 5.8 per cent for instance). This is mostly due to the specific characteristics of the Chinese stock market; not only is it still underdeveloped (Luo et al., 2009) , but the government has made use of it as a fundraising tool for funding state-owned and state-controlled companies (which account for a high percentage of the listed companies). Furthermore, China's stock market developed under a repressed financial market and in a weak legal environment, which has offered little protection to shareholders.
Although La Porta et al. (2008) identify China's legal system as originating from German civil law, a unique characteristic of China's legal tradition is that the judicial system is not independent of the government's administrative system (Zhang and Zhang, 2014) .
Concentrated state ownership, unclear laws governing private property rights, and a lack of judicial independence therefore characterise China's market, as the government protects state interests over the rights of individuals.
Additionally, given the stock segmentation, China's stock market is not immediately accessible to foreign investors (even though the picture has changed rapidly in the last years) and this affects China's stock market integration. As stated above, on the SSE, A-shares and B-shares are listed, with A-shares priced in the local RMB currency and intended for domestic investors only, and B-shares listed in US dollars and distributable to overseas investors. However, since 2002, China has permitted foreign institutional investors to purchase bonds or stocks listed in the Chinese A-share market, explaining why A-shares are the most important segment of China's stock market (Deloitte, 2015) .
Chinese regulators have closely followed the development of the Basel Accords and have shown a strong willingness to integrate international regulatory rules into Chinese regulatory practices, with some adaptations for market features. In 2008, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) finalised Basel II implementation in China through the publication of five sets of guidance. In 2010, the CBRC released the Implementation of Four New Supervisory Instruments (Draft Discussion) to merge Basel III's new tools for capital adequacy, anti-cyclical capital charge, liquidity and bank regulation into the Chinese regulatory framework. In 2013, China adopted reforms regarding corporate disclosure rules, which modified the landscape considerably, and in December 2015 the CSRC rolled out a series of money market funds provisions to strike a balance between the need for innovation and risk minimisation in capital markets, with the main aims being to improve disclosure and transparency.
Literature review and research hypotheses

Literature review
Previous studies have confirmed that firm characteristics relate to corporate risk disclosure.
When testing associations between firm characteristics and risk information disclosed, Linsley and Shrives (2006) found that firm size and level of environmental risk are passively associated with the amount of risk disclosure. Abraham and Cox (2007) also suggest that corporate governance is an important factor to consider when studying risk disclosure drivers. Elshandidy et al. (2013) examine the relationship between risk disclosures and firm risk levels. Consistent with managers' incentive (agency and signalling) theories, their results confirm that risky firms are likely to significantly disclose risk information, suggesting managers are motivated to provide higher levels of information to reduce information asymmetry (Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) . According to a study by Miihkinen (2012) , in the presence of detailed risk disclosure standards and guidelines, firms disclose more qualitative risk information and action plans relating to economic impacts, thereby improving the quality of firms' overall risk reviews.
In terms of the impact of risk disclosure, information asymmetry is a long-standing concern for both investors and regulators. The results of research by Verrecchia (2001) show that, in imperfectly competitive markets, the degree of information asymmetry is related to market illiquidity and the cost of capital. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) theorise that firms with valid risk disclosures have lower risk premiums. When risk disclosures are voluntary, as opposed to mandatory, risk premiums also tend to be lower. In addition, improved information disclosure increases market liquidity, because investors are less likely to feel uninformed and artificially raise prices. These arguments are empirically supported by Elshandidy and Neri's (2015) findings. Consistent with these results, Campbell et al. (2014) conclude that, when the bid-ask price is used as a proxy for market liquidity, the risk factor is positively related to a reduction in information asymmetry.
Research hypotheses: Main determinants and impacts on market liquidity
Firm size
According to agency theory, larger firms tend to incur lower disclosure costs than smaller firms, as agency theory argues that larger firms need to disclose more information to different user groups leading to a decline in agency costs and reducing information asymmetries (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983) . However, in prior studies, the association between firm size and level of disclosure has proven to be either negative or positive. Kou and Hussain (2007) observe a negative relationship between firm size and disclosures, whereas Linsley and Shrives' (2006) work supports a positive relationship between the two.
Risk reporting literature highlights no significant influence from firm size on the quantity and/or quality of risk disclosure (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004) , on negative relations, (Campbell et al., 2014) or positive influences on aggregated disclosure (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007) . In a study of 559 Chinese firms in 2002, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) find that larger firms offer greater disclosure, while Li et al.'s (2013) study of all Chinese listed firms with A-shares in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database identifies a positive relationship between size and disclosure. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Larger Chinese firms in the financial sector tend to deliver more and higher-quality risk disclosure information to the market.
Risk
Based on signalling theory, as managers disclose more risk-related information investor uncertainty reduces. Disclosure can decrease the perceived risk associated with a firm because an open disclosure strategy should result in a better assessment of the firm's future performance (Jorgensen and Kirscenheiter, 2003) . Firms also benefit from this practice, because it helps them to avoid unnecessary losses, especially for high-risk firms. According to Elshandidy and Neri (2015) , firms with higher risks usually disclose more information in order to avoid misunderstandings among investors, and this is consistent with Elshandidy et al. (2013) . Firth et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between risk profile and the level of earnings disclosure in the Chinese market. Finally, investors also require high-risk firms to present the methods they have employed to evaluate risk drivers to gain deeper insights before making decisions. Given the above considerations, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Chinese financial firms with higher risks are more likely to provide high-quality risk disclosures.
Capital structure
According to signalling theory, managers in firms heavily financed by debt tend to disclose more information, so as to satisfy the needs of creditors (Elshandidy et al., 2013) .
Considering the agency theory perspective, creditors of high leveraged companies should have greater incentives to recommend that management disclose more information. This is supported by Elshandidy et al. (2013) , who find a positive relationship between risk level and risk disclosure. They also confirm that risky firms are likely to disclose more information than less risky firms, to avoid market misinterpretations. However, previous studies of the possible association between level of risk and the amount of risk disclosure have discovered an insignificant association (Abraham and Cox, 2007) . In the Chinese context Ferguson et al. Hypothesis 3: The capital structure of Chinese financial firms is positively associated with risk disclosure quality.
Growth
High-growth firms are likely to experience greater information asymmetry and higher agency costs (Gaver and Gaver, 1993) . Gul and Leung (2004) claim that companies with a high growth potential need to disclose superior information to the market to signal that their stock is not overvalued. Considering risk disclosure, Elshandidy et al. Hypothesis 4: There is no association between BTM ratio and the quality of risk disclosure by Chinese financial firms.
Market liquidity and quality of risk disclosure
The market-efficiency coefficient (MEC) expresses a market's price fluidity. Markets with high liquidity are better equipped to support changes in price (Welker, 1995) . Therefore, a price-based measurement is used in this paper to determine market liquidity. Higher levels of disclosure are expected to diminish any information asymmetry between current and prospective shareholders, as disclosure can increase the liquidity of a security (Easley and O'Hara, 2004) . Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that performance variability affects disclosure levels negatively, recognising an association between the volatility of market returns and disclosure levels. Furthermore, investors and analysts could include risk information in their price choices and recommendations and increase market liquidity by working on information asymmetry (Campbell et al., 2014) . Elshandidy and Neri (2015) find that risk disclosure practices (mandatory and voluntary) provided by UK firms significantly and negatively influence the bid-ask spread, suggesting this information reduces information asymmetry between market participants improving market liquidity. Furthermore, Elshandidy and Neri (2015) find that voluntary, rather than mandatory, risk disclosure provided by Italian firms improves market liquidity by reducing information asymmetry. No significant research has shown that this finding is also true in the Chinese market. This knowledge leads us to formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: There is an association between market liquidity and risk disclosure quality for Chinese financial firms.
Sample and methodology
Sample selection and data collection
Our sample is based on financial firms listed in the A-shares market of the SSE for the period 2013-2015, as the market became more mature during this period, which makes it is possible to effectively evaluate risk regulation implementation in the Chinese market.
Additionally, by covering this period we can observe any potential impact from the most recent (2014) financial crisis in the Chinese market. Based on a list generated by Thomson One, 102 financial firms were listed on the SSE in the period to 2015. Therefore, the sample features 102 financial firms. Firms publish their annual reports according to PRC GAAP.
Two organisations were omitted because they were not listed during the entirety of the period of observation, so the final sample comprises 100 firms. All included organisations have a fiscal year end of 31 December, and measurements of market liquidity and observations were pooled for the whole period.
Annual reports for the above firms were collected from Thomson One and from the companies' websites. Data collection for risk disclosure quality focused on annual reports, since these are the primary source of information for investors (Miihkinen, 2013) . Corporate governance data were collected from Orbis and manually from annual reports, while financial data for each firm (such as share price and market value) were collected from Datastream.
Identification of variables
In measuring the quality of risk disclosure and consistent with Miihkinen (2012) , four measurement indicators are considered in this paper: quantity of disclosures, coverage of disclosures, and the semantic properties, depth and outlook.
Risk disclosure quantity
This paper uses the number of sentences concerning risk disclosure that appear in the annual report as a proxy for risk disclosure quantity. Thus, it is measured as: QUANTITYi = ln (total number of sentences containing risk disclosure)
Risk disclosure coverage
The topics identified in the annual reports are financial risks, damage risks and risk management (Linsley and Shrives, 2006) . As suggested by Miihkinen (2012) , this paper uses the Herfindahl index to identify the concentration of risk topics within corporate disclosures.
COVERAGEi= [(1/H)/Number of main risk topics]
where H = measures the concentration of risk topics, and Pi represents the proportion of risk disclosure sentences on topic i. In order to increase the Herfindahl index value, so that it displays comprehensive coverage of the information, this paper uses the inverse of H.
Risk disclosure depth
The semantic properties of the information disclosed in corporate communications include depth and the outlook profile. Depth concerns the content of disclosed risk information, which predicts any economic impact on future performance. Disclosure depth gives users a better understanding of firms. The empirical indicators are as follows:
where kj is the number of risk information sentences in the annual report, and qualitativej equals 1 if the risk information sentence j in the annual report of firm i contains qualitative information about expected future performance, and otherwise is represented by 0.
where kj equals the total number of sentences containing risk-related information in the annual report, and quantitativej equals 1 if the risk information sentence j in the annual report of firm i contains quantitative information about expected future performance, and otherwise is represented by 0.
Outlook profile
As one of the semantic properties of risk disclosure, the outlook profile expresses how firms disclose their planned approach to risk (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004) . Risk disclosures explain the presence of risks, the future expectations of a firm and its risk management approach. The empirical indicators are as follows:
where kj equals the number of sentences referring to risk in the annual report, and acpj equals 1 if the risk information sentence j in the annual report of firm i contains information about the risk management approach, and otherwise is represented by 0.
Composite quality of risk disclosure
Applying the factor analysis method, the composite quality of risk disclosure is used to examine the relationships between multiple variables by combining data into a smaller set.
This measure is used to summarise the five previously-mentioned individual quality indicators as follows: QUALITY = the score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue This paper uses the manual content analysis method to measure the quality of any risk disclosure, also applied in Elshandidy et al. (2013) . This is preferred due to its precision when compared with the automated method adopted in Linsley and Shrives (2006) .
To test the reliability and validity of risk disclosure quality scores, this paper uses the Cronbach's Alpha to measure how well a dataset captures an underlying construct (Elshandidy et al., 2013) . The Cronbach's Alpha is 94 per cent for the risk disclosure quality scores in this paper. Therefore, it can be concluded that the risk disclosure score computed using manual content analysis is internally consistent and acceptable.
Firm characteristics
This includes firm size, risk, capital structure, and growth. Definitions and measures for these variables are detailed in Appendix 1.
Corporate governance
This includes board size, board independence, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, state ownership and audit quality. Definitions and measures of these variables are detailed in Appendix 1. Here we control for these variables because prior research finds evidence of their effects on firm (risk) disclosure.
Regarding board size, some researchers (i.e. Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) suggest that larger boards could be more likely to decrease actual agency costs by aligning different potential conflicts of interest. In the Chinese context, Firth et al. (2007) find that larger boards are associated with a greater level of earnings disclosure information.
Board independence has been highlighted in previous research (Gul and Leung, 2004 ) as a possible significant variable. In the Chinese context, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) find that disclosure increases the more independent directors on a board.
The positions of CEO and chairman should ideally be kept separate, as doing so should lower agency costs and improve corporate governance (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) .
The findings of earlier studies highlighting a negative or positive impact arising from CEO duality on level of disclosure are mixed (i.e. Huafang and Jianguo, 2007) .
We include State ownership as a variable, dues to the fact that many companies on the SSE are partially or ultimately owned by central or local governments. Wang et al. (2008) find the level of disclosure is positively related to the proportion of state ownership.
Finally, regarding audit quality, it has been argued that when financial reports are audited by highly-reputable external audit firms, this increases the confidence of investors (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) . Wang et al. (2008) illustrate that the use of large auditors does relate to increased levels of disclosure in the Chinese context.
Market liquidity
Under the requirement of the Chinese GAAP (PRC GAAP), audited annual reports from listed firms in China must be made available to public users by 30 April, four months after the end of the fiscal year. Consistent with Miihkinen (2013) and Elshandidy and Neri (2015) , this paper calculates the average relative spread over a three-month period, from the beginning of May to the end of July, by calculating the difference between daily ask and bid prices. This total is then divided by the average of the daily ask and bid prices. Share price volatility and trading volume are used as controls, while observing the impact of risk disclosure on market liquidity.
Empirical model development
This paper measures the impact of firm characteristics on risk disclosure quality and the influence of risk disclosure quality on market liquidity, through the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The estimation model is represented as:
where ( 
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table I provides descriptive statistics for the continuous variables mentioned in Section 3. These include risk disclosure, market indicators, firm characteristics and corporate governance. This paper winsorises the variables at the first and 99th percentiles. Table I gives the number of observations, the mean, standard deviation, lower quartile, median and upper quartile. The three dummy variables are CEO duality, audit quality and state ownership. Panel B displays their frequencies.
The mean and median statistics for QAN and DQAL are relatively close in value,
showing a symmetrical distribution.
[Insert Table I] 
Regression results
Tables II displays the OLS regression results based on the dependent variables of risk disclosure quality and its five quality dimensions. With the exception of COV, firm size is 1 The unreported (for brevity, but they are available on request from the authors) correlation coefficient indicates that firms with higher-quality risk disclosures also release more comprehensive risk information. This suggests, consistent with Miihkinen (2012) , that quantity is a good proxy for quality when assessing narrative disclosures in annual reports. It worth considering that all quality indicators have high positive factor loadings, as the loadings of QUANTITY, COVERAGE, DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE, DEPTH_QUALITATIVE, and OUTLOOK_PROFILE are 0.983, -0.111, 0.853, 0.979 and 0.616, respectively. The first factor accounts for 76.7 per cent of the total variance in the quality indicator of risk disclosure.
significantly and positively associated with all the other dimensions of risk disclosure quality (.222, .130, .223 and 0.41 respectively, at 1% level).
These findings are consistent with empirical research on risk disclosure (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Miihkinen, 2012; Elshandidy et al., 2015) and suggest that large firms have incentives to signal their ability to provide high quality information about their risks, differing from smaller firms. This is consistent with this paper's expectation and therefore supports H1.
While the results suggest that firm risk does not significantly influence the majority of risk reporting quality dimensions, it is significantly and positively associated with quantitative information contained in risk disclosures (.308 at 1% level). This significant impact is consistent with signalling theory; high-risk firms are more likely to disclose more risk information to avoid market misinterpretation as illustrated by some previous empirical findings ( Elshandidy et al., 2013) . The non-significant impact is consistent with the theoretical argument put forward by Linsley and Shrives (2006) , that risky firms might be more sensitive to revealing more risk information in order to avoid market attention. Overall, and based on this discussion, our findings do not fully support H2.
Capital structure is significantly and negatively related to quantitative risk information (-.019 at 1% level). The increased risk of bankruptcy and the behaviour of managers that tend to avoid transparency possibly explain this result. The negative relationship derived from these results concurs with previous studies (Miihkinen, 2012) .
Examining the other dimensions of risk quality more generally, there is no significant relationship between leverage and the quality (quantity) of risk disclosure, implying that in the Chinese financial market, capital structure is not an influential factor in revealing quality risk information. This does not support our H3.
The BTM ratio is positively correlated with QAN (.044 at 1% level) and risk disclosure depth, both in terms of the quantitative and qualitative nature of risk information (.036 and .043, respectively, at the 1% level). These results suggest that the high-growth Regarding the control variables, we find that the size of the board of directors (BS) seems to affect risk disclosure quantity and quality, while the coefficients for board independence (BI) are negative in all the models illustrated in Table II [Insert Table II] Table III, in Model 1 and Model 2, shows how the quality and quantity of risk disclosure affect market liquidity. Our results highlight a negative association between bidask spread and risk disclosure quantity and quality (-.019 and -.024 respectively, at 1% level), suggesting this information is useful, as investors are likely to consider it when making pricing decisions, given that it contributes to reducing information asymmetry among market participants. At the same time, risk disclosure is significantly and negatively associated with trading volume (-.006 for both QAN and QAL at 1% level). This could have been driven by trading activity on the market, which has shown an increasing pattern over the years and a consequent readjustment during and since the financial crisis. These results support H5.
[Insert Table III Collectively, our results indicate that our conclusions, as discussed under Table III and -.036 at the 5% level for QAL and QAN) impacted market liquidity during these years.
In general, this paper confirms previous findings about the Chinese market (Luo et al., 2009) ; i.e. that, given a decreasing but still strong state presence, there is higher stock volatility and weak corporate governance.
[Insert Table IV] [Insert Table V] We also ran additional tests to ascertain whether our results were affected by endogeneity and structural change. An endogeneity problem can arise when omitting variables and/or from reverse causality. First, we replicated our main analyses under Tables   II and III by running fixed effects regressions. Arguably, these can be considered a way to address omitted variables, since they eliminate any influence from time-invariant unobservable variables (e.g. Brown et al., 2011) . The determinants of QAN and QAL risk disclosure under fixed effects models are broadly consistent with our general conclusions under Table II . Similarly, the conclusions regarding the impact of risk disclosure practices on market liquidity, based on the fixed effects models are consistent with those drawn based on 
Conclusion
This paper examined the main drivers for risk disclosure quality, and studied the impact of such disclosure on market liquidity for financial firms listed on the SSE A-shares market.
We found firm size to be the most significant factor influencing risk disclosure.
Other firm characteristics (firm risk and capital structure), however, proved not significantly associated with risk disclosure quality, suggesting that these variables have no influence on the determination of risk disclosure. Furthermore, we found that risk disclosure quality has an impact on market liquidity, and when we analysed each year we noticed that the results were driven by the year 2013; moreover, we noticed no or little significance from the period of the emerging financial crisis. Our results suggest that Chinese banks provided the market with less informative risk information during the recent crisis of 2014, and the content of this information did not provide incremental value to the investors. This paper's methodology may have been limited due to its subjectivity, as there is inherent subjectivity when determining a coding scheme. Furthermore, the labour-intensive nature of the data analysis method limits scope, and as a result, only a small number of companies are investigated. In order to overcome these limitations, the problems of subjectivity and labour-intensiveness could be resolved by adopting automated content analysis (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013) . Furthermore, taking into account the trend towards globalisation in the Chinese economy, further researchers might also investigate the impact of these variables on risk disclosure across different nations.
Cheng Table I , and as detailed in Appendix 1. All statistics are based on a sample of all financial firms in the Shanghai A-shares market are listed only in China. impact of firm characteristics and control variables on risk disclosure quantity and quality. The R-squared value describes the model's ability to account for changes in each risk quality indicator. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. Definitions of the above variables are detailed in Appendix 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance for two-tailed tests at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively. 
